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ABSTRACT Contemporary globalized capital presents particular difficulties when it comes
to mapping its dynamics, such that imagining what might lie beyond it becomes even more
challenging than in earlier stages of capitalist development. For instance, one of the tenden-
cies of contemporary capital is to “stall” a certain perceptual-representational faculty on the
part of the collective subject that would otherwise encourage the enunciation of a collective
identity-for-itself and a utopian imaginary of a formation “beyond capitalism”—one of the
ingredients for social transformation.
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RÉSUMÉ  Le capital mondial contemporain soulève des problèmes particuliers quand il s’agit
de comprendre sa dynamique, à tel point qu’imaginer ce qui surviendrait au-delà devient
encore plus difficile que lors d’étapes antérieures du capitalisme. À ce titre, une des tendances
du capital contemporain est d’affaiblir une certaine faculté perceptuelle/représentationnelle
de la part du sujet collectif. Cette faculté, si elle demeurait forte, pourrait mener à une identité-
pour-soi collective et un imaginaire utopien permettant d’entrevoir un au-delà pour le
capitalisme, jetant ainsi les bases d’une transformation sociale.
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Introduction: The problem of utopia
Surveying the postmodern mediascape of Northern consumer societies as an indexof the popular imagination, one is inclined to reiterate Fredric Jameson’s claim that
it is easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism
(Jameson, 1994). For those radical activists and thinkers compelled by the two-part
project of imagining an end to capitalism and imagining an alternative social forma-
tion to capitalism, the global economic crisis of 2008 dealt a double blow: first,
through the pervasive precipitation of material hardship (job loss, loss of savings and
pensions, loss of property, paralyzing debt and bankruptcy, homelessness, hunger,
and so on); and second, through the apparent failure of an anti-capitalist “spirit”1 to
seize the day—to offer engaging visions and explanations and, most significantly, a
plan that could ignite desire, quell fear, and simply make another way of living in the
world seem possible enough to mobilize the building of it. If not now, then when?
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What ingredients must be added to the mix, what obstacles must be eradicated before
even the vague outline of a postcapitalist society can appear on the horizon? Is the
recent example of the failure to realize the opportunity latent in this (and every)
social crisis the “fault” of we “bearers” of the social formation to sufficiently picture,
narrate, or grasp for ourselves what is possible and what is at stake? Or is it the “fault”
of capitalism itself for being just too resilient, too mystifying, and too entrenched,
while somehow simultaneously fluid and ever-changing?
These questions have long animated what Jameson calls “the Utopian problem,”
the problem of realizing a postrevolutionary society (Jameson, 1988, p. 355). The
utopian problem was a problem long before Marx, although his recalibration of it has
likely been the most significant and impactful one to date. However, after Marx, by the
early– to mid–twentieth century, the utopian problem took on a characteristically
“modernist” orientation. In its articulation in the work of the “Western Marxists” (pri-
marily Georg Lukács and the Frankfurt School critical theorists), the problem became
one of positing a “vision that could grip the masses” (Jameson, 1988, p. 355); in other
words, it was recast as a perceptual problem and a problem of representation—a situ-
ation that can be transcoded into the growing imperative of the question of ideology
across the twentieth century. Since then, the utopian problem is, for the most part, no
longer animated by debates concerning the mechanics of an alternative society or
mode of production, but by debates around why visions of an alternative society seem
to have stalled altogether or, at least, gone underground, or why they can be detected
only in allegorical forms such as science fiction that can travel incognito as “entertain-
ment.” The popular media narrative of the economic crisis is that it was the fault of
some greedy, ruthless capitalists along with some dopey political leaders who were
either asleep at the wheel or in the pocket of said greedy capitalists. A more adequate
reading of the situation calls for a more “ideological” analysis, that is, both a more
structural and more historical account.
Jameson calls for a new aesthetic response to the latest articulation of the utopian
problem, a new form of exercising the social imagination that he calls cognitive map-
ping (Jameson, 1988). For Jameson, cognitive mapping is a specifically spatial and
totalizing imaginative operation that addresses what is specifically “newly spatial and
totalizing” about the dynamics of postmodern capitalism. The goal of the exercise,
however, is common to all utopian thought in the Marxian tradition: to map the social
world in such a way as to not only reveal its constitutive contradictions, but reveal
how they might be poised to propel capitalism beyond itself, to turn capitalism into
the substance of a new mode of production. The theme of cognitive mapping, and the
goal it shares with Marxian utopian thought more generally, underwrites the present
discussion. More precisely, I want to suggest some reasons why cognitive mapping—
as the production of a “vision that grips the masses”—is so difficult, why it so readily
stalls in the era of advanced global capitalism.
Contemporary globalized capital presents particular difficulties when it comes to
mapping its dynamics and limits, such that imagining what might lie beyond it
becomes even more challenging than in earlier stages of capitalist development. I am
suggesting that, today more than ever, capitalism designates a certain regime of repre-
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sentation as much as it does a regime of accumulation, that it constitutes a particular
mode of perception as much as it does a mode of production. This argument is not
new; both Marx and the Western Marxists argued that capitalism produces specific
kinds of subjects who develop certain faculties over others and, more importantly, a
specific kind of collective subject that inhabits the world through a certain collective
perceptual modality (one whose tendency is to image the collective subject as an
aggregate of individuals, for example). My analysis is informed by this body of work,
with one significant addition to the roster. In an attempt to express the way that cap-
ital’s mode of perception arrests a collective representational faculty, I found it useful
to make an allegory of Julia Kristeva’s model of the psychic condition of depression. In
Kristeva’s analysis, the psychic condition of depression is an expression of the stalling
of a representational function in the individual psychic subject. This symbolic break-
down refers to the subject’s inability to represent the lost object of desire. Kristeva’s
narrative of the representational economy of depression serves as an evocative alle-
gory for the stalling of a different perceptual and representational faculty on the part
of the collective subject in advanced capitalist societies.
My goal here is simply to qualify the “failure” that I alluded to at the start, the fail-
ure of an anti-capitalist spirit to seize the day’s revolutionary openings. The blame for
this failure does not lie with the subjects of contemporary capitalist societies, even
though the responsibility for social change can lie nowhere else (that is, with “us”). The
cause is to be found in that pseudo-objective, always moving and evolving, historical
structure-process we call capitalism, so long as we avoid reinstalling the mystifying oppo-
sition between agency and structure by recognizing that the structure, in this case, is a
product of “our” collective agency, or, to use Hegel’s phraseology, that it is simply the
externalization of the subject through productive activity. This recognition of the iden-
tity between subject and object, intended by Hegel as an affront to the liberal empiricist
concept of their irreconcilable division, is Marx’s answer to the historical state of alien-
ation. Alienation, reconfigured and re-signified later by Marx as the more structural
process of fetishization, speaks to the subject’s inability to recognize his/her own agency
as the creative source of the object world that otherwise oppresses him/her. For both
Hegel and Marx, this simple shift in perspective initiates the transformation of an iden-
tity/class-in-itself to an identity/class-for-itself. For Hegel, this transformation is a condi-
tion for an adequate knowledge of the world; for Marx it is a condition for changing it
with a plan, in other words, for intentional, political action, or praxis. For Marx, acknowl-
edging that human beings make history but they do not make it under conditions of
their own choosing, which is to say that even the “best” intentions can take unexpected
turns or lead to undesirable ends, did not invalidate the political work of organizing,
planning, envisaging, or generally that which he calls praxis. Unfortunately, the dismissal
of the category of “intentionality” as a symptom of an unacceptable logocentrism has
now become an obstacle to theoretical work in this area. One idea that motivates this
analysis is that it may be time to reintroduce, with all its warning labels in plain sight,
the category of intentionality into radical social and cultural analysis.
Praxis is supported by a certain perceptual-representational faculty on the part of
the collective subject that encourages the transcendence of the apparent subject–
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object opposition, the enunciation of a collective identity-for-itself, and a utopian imag-
inary of a formation “beyond capitalism”—one of the ingredients for social transforma-
tion. The stalling of this perceptual-representational faculty is one aspect of what Marx
refers to as fetishization (and a situation that Lukács will call reification). To offer an
analysis of this historically determined “stalling” and of why, as one of capitalism’s
intrinsic tendencies, it is intensified in the context of global capital is the goal of the fol-
lowing discussion.
Capitalism’s representational economy
Speaking of the history of the Great Depression, John Steinbeck once remarked that
the reason social revolution never took place in the United States was that the poor
did not see themselves as poor, or exploited, or oppressed, but as temporarily embar-
rassed millionaires. In broad terms, the way in which a population mentally maps
the social world will play a large part in either its endurance or its transformation,
whether the latter is an abrupt overturning or an incremental evolution. The relative
long-term stability of traditional (pre-modern) society in the West was characterized
by a relatively stable set of social representations: narratives, explanations, depic-
tions of the world and the cosmos and the dynamic between them. The emergence
of modern society is most often depicted by scholars as a collective “re-mapping” (lit-
erally and figuratively) of the world—as the social production of new images, new
narratives, and new explanations of virtually every dimension of human society and
beyond.
If we think of capitalism as a historical process wherein market exchange (and its
corresponding forms, such as wage labour) comes to represent the predominant, as
opposed to occasional, mode of producing-distributing a society’s resources, then the
conventionalizing of a particular collective mode of seeing, understanding, and
explaining the social world is one dimension of this historical process. In traditional
society, human survival is organized in the imagination of its members as a collective
endeavour. Here, collectivity may be organized and thus conceptualized in various
ways—tribe, clan, family, protectorate of the lord or monarch, Kingdom of God, the
Great Chain of Being—but it is the fundamental unit of social meaning, organization,
production, and survival. The emergence of capitalism necessarily entails (among
other things) the displacing of the image of the collectivity at the centre of the collec-
tive imaginary by the new “modern” image of the individual at the centre of the col-
lective imaginary.
In Capital, Volume 1, Marx describes the way in which the activity of market
exchange produces, for the first time, human beings who are able to perceive them-
selves as independent from—as not intrinsically tethered to—one another and an
“original” collectivity. The process of conventionalizing the activity of exchanging
labour-power for a wage releases human beings both materially and conceptually
from the feudal (tribal, familial, communal, that is, explicitly social) bonds that were,
at one time, the only means of their reproduction. The wage relation is a mode of pro-
duction, but it is also a mode of perception. It is the social production of the modern
category of the autonomous individual: commodity owners tacitly agree to treat each
other “as the private owners of … alienable things, and, precisely for that reason, as
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persons who are independent of each other” (Marx, 1976, p. 182). This is the wonder-
ful, terrible gift of the bourgeois revolution that Marx and Engels describe in the
Communist Manifesto:
The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feu-
dal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal
ties that bound man to his “natural superiors,” and has left remaining no other
nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “cash pay-
ment.” It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of
chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotis-
tical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in
place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single,
unconscionable freedom—Free Trade. (Marx & Engels, 1978, p. 475)
The stabilizing of market society requires, as one of its elements, that the new sub-
jects of “economy” (commodity owners and wage labourers), as this new abstracted
sphere of activity will be called, conventionalize the perception-understanding of their
mutual relationship as one of “reciprocal isolation and foreignness” (Marx, 1976,
p. 182), as opposed to kinship or moral or religious obligation. Among other possible
designations, this is the perceptual modality (or ideology) of the “free-worker,” and as
Marx argues, world history unfurls from this one important recalibration of the collec-
tive imaginary: “[Capital] arises only when the owner of the means of production and
subsistence finds the free-worker available, on the market, as the seller of his own
labour-power. And this one historical pre-condition comprises a world history” (Marx,
1976, p. 274).
However, the historical process of the free-worker—the social production of the
atomized individual—has a counterpart, namely, universal material interdependence:
The owners of commodities therefore find out that the same division of
labour which turns them into independent private producers also makes the
social process of production and the relations of the independent producers
to each other within that process independent of the producers themselves;
they also find out that the independence of the individuals from each other has
as its counterpart and supplement a system of all-round material dependence.
(Marx, 1976, p. 202, emphasis added)
The production of the free-worker and the process of the social division of
labour—a “system of all-round material dependence”—call each other into existence.
The social division of labour entails that each free-worker is inserted into, and thus
becomes entirely dependent upon, a system of production that vastly exceeds
him/her, geographically, temporally, spatially, and so on:
[S]eparate individuals have, with the broadening of their activity into world-
historical activity, become more and more enslaved under a power alien to
them (a pressure which they have conceived of as a dirty trick on the part of
the so-called universal spirit, etc.), a power which has become more and
more enormous and, in the last instance, turns out to be the world market.
(Marx & Engels, 1978, p. 163, emphasis in original)
Best The Problem of Utopia: Capitalism, Depression, and Representation 501
The world market, for Marx, is a totalizing dynamic: “The need of a constantly
expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the
globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere”
(Marx & Engels, 1978, p. 476). As a mode of production, the world market intrinsically
poses a representational dilemma to a collective imaginary organized on the category of
the isolated individual. The social division of labour, or the totalizing-decentring force of
capitalist production, initiates a situation that is today exceedingly banal and yet equally
as unmappable as it was in the early nineteenth century—in fact, more so given the
greater complexity of capital’s nexus: “our insertion as individual subjects into a multi-
dimensional set of radically discontinuous realities, whose frames range from the still
surviving spaces of bourgeois private life all the way to the unimaginable decentring of
global capital itself” (Jameson, 1988, p. 351). According to Jameson, the consequent
unmappability of the social totality—what he calls the “problems of figuration”—does
not become particularly visible (or symptomatic) until the passage from market to
monopoly capital—capital’s “imperialism stage”—where capital’s networks are increas-
ingly global and the contradiction between the possible “phenomenological description
of the life of an individual and a more properly structural model of the conditions of exis-
tence of that experience” becomes even more exaggerated (Jameson, 1988, p. 349). Even
the phenomenal experience of some people today of relatively easy international travel
does not come close to approximating the material reality of the spatial and temporal
dimensions of the global circuits of capital that are engaged when the average consumer
in the North makes breakfast. The truth of the experience has long since ceased to bear
any resemblance to its phenomenal forms—to its existential time and place:
[T]hose structural coordinates are no longer accessible to immediate lived
experience and are often not even conceptualizable for most people.
There comes into being, then, a situation in which we can say that if individ-
ual experience is authentic, then it cannot be true; and that if a scientific or
cognitive model of the same content is true, then it escapes individual expe-
rience. It is evident that this new situation poses tremendous and crippling
problems for a work of art [or for critical explanations-representations of the
social world, or for utopian imaginaries]. (Jameson, 1988, p. 349)
It is not a matter of an intrinsic perceptual deficiency on the part of the subjects
of economy (“us”), nor is this an argument about human nature. For Marx, human
nature is ultimately historical: “every society constructs its own” (Jameson, 2004, p.
37). As is Marx’s analysis in Capital, this is a structural historicist diagnosis and, there-
fore, unlike a kind of functionalism for which it might also be mistaken, it hinges on
what Marx calls a “tendency.” The notion of a tendency can cause discomfort to those
more inclined to non-contradictory thinking (where if something is A, it cannot also
be B) or to those who do not take Hegel’s point that it is the exception that proves the
rule instead of disproving it. Marx describes a tendency as a characteristic movement
of capital that is generalized and pervasive but, as such, cannot be either adequately
captured or contradicted by any single occasion (any single capitalist enterprise, for
instance). Some of capital’s tendencies identified by Marx are the tendency for private
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enterprise to expand, for real wages to decline, for a greater mechanization of produc-
tion, and for capital to move toward crisis. These tendencies may not necessarily char-
acterize the dynamic of every capitalist enterprise, but they will characterize most
enterprises, most of the time, and the moment they do not, we will have brought
about, either intentionally or not, a different mode of production.
The stalling of a certain collective perceptual-representational faculty is a ten-
dency in capitalism: less as a mechanical or functional response and more in
Raymond Williams’ sense of a structure of feeling, where the consequence of a partic-
ular historical organization of society is a matter of setting limits and exerting pres-
sures, in this case, on the collective imagination. What limits, for instance, prevent the
popular narrativizing of full employment? What pressures arrest the popular demand
for socializing the banks and failing automobile and insurance industries that were
recently bailed out? The possibility of letting these industries fail—a vision thoroughly
consistent with a competitive-individualist market ideology—was called for in the
streets, en masse, but the idea of their social control was not popularly entertained: a
telling situation, where popular imagination lagged significantly behind real, material
conditions for social transformation. In fact, I propose that the most stubborn obsta-
cle to social change in the global North is not an absence of the social-technical know-
how to build a society “beyond capitalism,” but the absence of the general desire to
do so, even on the part of those whose most basic material needs are not addressed
by the status quo. Dallas Smythe’s observation in Dependency Road is still valid: “a
dominated class can make a successful revolution only when it has first created pub-
lic opinion to support it” (Smythe, 1981, p. 271). Smythe also says in this text that
“whatever new political directions popular consciousness … embraces, when it does,
the role of the mass media will be central and crucial to the struggle then to take place”
(p. 286). This is as true today, in the age of the Internet, as it was then.
Jameson regards the stalling of a utopian representational faculty as one symp-
tom (one that requires “diagnosis and a more effective therapy”!) of the more general
condition of postmodernity (the ideological or cultural form of advanced capitalism),
also characterized by a waning of history, or the weakening of a generalized historical
sensibility (Jameson, 2004, p. 36). The waning of a collective sense of history is, for
Jameson, the companion to an inability to imagine a “beyond capitalism.” While reviv-
ing this faculty does not guarantee social change, it is difficult to imagine the materi-
alization of social change without it:
that weakening of the sense of history and of the imagination of historical dif-
ference which characterizes postmodernity is, paradoxically, intertwined
with the loss of that place beyond all history (or after its end) which we call
utopia. For another, it is difficult enough to imagine any radical political pro-
gramme today without the conception of systematic otherness, of an alterna-
tive society, which only the idea of utopia seems to keep alive, however feebly.
This clearly does not mean that, even if we succeed in reviving utopia itself,
the outlines of a new and effective practical politics for the era of globaliza-
tion will at once become visible; but only that we will never come to one
without it. (Jameson, 2004, p. 36)
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If we can code the stalling of a utopian perceptual faculty as a collective weaken-
ing of a sense of history, as Jameson suggests, we can also code it as a weakening of a
sense of “totality,” as in the sense of the social world as an overdetermined causal
structure (à la Althusser, 1969), or of the essential interconnectedness of the various
distinct moments of a living-moving system. The concept of totality has not widely
“recovered” from its dismissal in the postinterpretive turn in critical theory in the
1980s. Totality, in Marx’s appropriation of the Hegelian category, designates the inter-
relationship of the diverse elements of an organic system or structure. Marx deploys
the concept to capture how the movement of the historical and social process of cap-
ital can only proceed through a heterogeneity of expressive forms. However, since the
1980s in particular, totality has been misconstrued as a category of incorporation and
homogenization, and rejected as a “universalizing grand narrative.” This is unfortu-
nate and particularly untimely, since the category remains pivotal to demystifying the
movement of capitalism’s reproduction, now more than ever, in light of capital’s
highly protracted global configuration, where the mediating channels of its disparate
forms are more complex and abstracted than at any other time. The stalling of a total-
izingmapping faculty expresses itself in the tendency for subjects in capitalism to gen-
erate fragmented or atomized social maps—a tendency that intensifies with capital’s
current global configuration. In this way, we could refer to a totalizing sense of the
essential interconnectedness of the social world as capitalism’s lost object.
Capitalism’s lost object
Following Marx, this theme was to become more explicit in the work of the Western
Marxists: capital’s tendency is to generate fragmented (or abstracted) self-representa-
tions that veil the “bigger picture,” that obfuscate a more adequate  portrait of capi-
tal’s intrinsic systematicity and nature as a moving process. In other words, the
conventionalizing of a certain vantage point that encourages compartmentalized
representations of the social world’s various moments is one of capital’s ideological
formations—one of the ways in which capital “sets limits and exerts pressures.” The
kind of utopian exercise that would therefore confront this perceptual modality—
that would go against the grain, so to speak—would be one that explicitly maps the
interconnections between capitalism’s various moments, between its apparently dis-
crete or atomized fields of social production. Whether we refer to these fields as the
economy, culture, or politics, or whether we choose more “specialized” (that is, more
highly abstracted and “reified”) designations—the state, civil society, the media, the
public sphere, government, health care, the military, education, the arts, science,
technology, the family, and so on—mapping their complex mediations in the mode
of production is a fundamental dimension of the project of positing a “beyond capi-
talism.” The development from a point of view of the class-in-itself to a point of view
of the class-for-self is, for Marx, one way of describing this collective shift in percep-
tual modality. For Lukács, the revolutionary potential of the proletariat is linked to a
potential systematic perceptual modality that he called “class consciousness”: “The
superior strength of true, practical class consciousness lies in the ability to look
beyond the divisive symptoms of the economic process to the unity of the total social
system underlying it. In the age of capitalism it is not possible for the total system to
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become directly visible in external phenomena” (Lukács, 1971, p. 74). The kind of rep-
resentations (or explanations of the social world) that generate for individuals the
sensation of their non-individuality—of their fundamentally collective orientation—
we can refer to as “totalizing” representations. Again, I have invoked the “old-fash-
ioned” figure of a totalizing representational strategy intentionally. The notion of a
totalizing representational practice is marked by a highly productive contradiction:
it is a practice of abstraction that allows the concrete dimensions (that is, the medi-
ated, relational, or negative dimensions) of the object to be revealed. As Lukács
points out emphatically in History and Class Consciousness, another name for a total-
izing representational strategy is dialectical thinking. Submitted to the renaming
strategies of Adorno and, later, Althusser, it also refers to what we now more conven-
tionally call “theory.”
But why does capitalism necessarily generate fragmented self-representations?
According to Marx’s analysis throughout Capital and the Grundrisse (1973), one of the
historical conditions for capital’s eventual hegemony in the nineteenth century is the
generalized appearance that market exchange, as a formal and hence non-coercive
social mechanism, replaces direct coercive control (founded on religious bond, feudal
obligation, or absolutist prerogative) over the production and distribution of the mate-
rial means of life. In other words, markets appear to signify the evacuation of what we
today call politics from social production. The truth, for Marx, of capitalism’s inherently
exploitative movement—that capital is by definition the private appropriation of the
value of the proletariat’s surplus labour by the bourgeoisie—signals a constitutive con-
tradiction between capital’s essential dynamic and its necessary, self-legitimating
appearance. In more contemporary theoretical language, the “equality of exchange
sutures over class exploitation” (Madra quoted in Byrne & Healy, 2006, p. 256).
This means that for capitalism to be systematically reproduced, politics must
appear as a completely separate and distinct sphere of activity from the “private”
sphere of market activity (producing, buying, selling, and so on). The emergence of
this discrete sphere of market activity (or “civil society”) simultaneously calls into
existence the state as an autonomous sphere of political activity. What Marx refers to
as the “abstraction of the state” is the process of the state’s emerging appearance of
autonomy from civil society, its hegemonic identity as an overseer of the economy, as
the arena for negotiating the incidental mutuality of freely interacting, mutually indif-
ferent agents of the wage contract. The appearance of a separate and autonomous
state contradicts its essential character as an expression itself of the relations of capi-
tal, as an extension of capital in the form of a supporting and stabilizing mechanism.
While the state and civil society are expressions of the same historical process, capital-
ism requires the relatively stable, collective (mis)recognition of their fundamental
atomization. As the totalizing movement of market exchange (commodification) pro-
ceeds to bring ever more traditional forms and spaces of social production into its
orbit, it continues to generate the appearance of a social world that is fundamentally
an aggregate of autonomous spheres of activity, identification (collective and individ-
ual), and production (material and symbolic): religion, the arts, public education, the
family, and so on. Lukács makes this same point:
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[In the development of capitalist society,] various aspects of the economy are
expanded and intensified, so that the “totality” becomes ever more closely
knit and substantial.… As a result of the objective structure of this … system,
the surface of capitalism appears to “disintegrate” into a series of elements
all driven towards independence. Obviously this must be reflected in the con-
sciousness of the men who live in this society.… (Lukács, 1977, pp. 31-32)
One of capitalism’s fundamental contradictions is that it is a social process that
must represent itself as the contrary of what it essentially is. That which Marx recog-
nized as the distinction between capitalism’s essence and its necessary appearances
defers the transcendence of capitalist social relations by suspending the contradiction
between subject and object. The popular perception of capitalism as an integrated and
historical structure—as the product (continuity, extension) of its agents’ own labour
and activity—can, therefore, in the specific historical context of capital, be described
as a “lost object.” The popular retrieval of this lost object will be one necessary ele-
ment of any revolutionary project.
Julia Kristeva’s representational economy of depression
If we think of the integrated social totality as an object that is increasingly lost to the
collective imagination in the course of the ever-protracting development of global cap-
italism—as Althusser’s “absent cause,” detectable only in its effects—then Julia
Kristeva’s narrative of the role of the lost object in the psychic condition of depression
provides a useful allegory for the stalling of the collective representational faculty in
capitalism.
In some psychoanalytic narratives, psychic development is structured around the
foundational event of the “lost object”; for Kristeva, it is the loss of the maternal
object of desire. In her book Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia (1989), Kristeva
characterizes the psychic condition of depression as a subject’s particular “intolerance
for object loss,” where the signifier has failed to resolve the subject’s subsequent state
of withdrawal. In other words, with the depressive condition, the signifier fails to do
its job of enacting the symbolic recovery of the lost object. Kristeva argues that nor-
mal psychic maturation involves resolving or negating this loss—this initial experi-
ence of abandonment—through symbolic activity, through the process of developing
language and through representational practices. While the subject cannot retrieve
the original lost object, she or he can capture it symbolically, or signify it, allowing nor-
mal psychic development to proceed. According to Kristeva, depression is a psychic
state that refers to subjects for whom, and for whatever reason, the original loss of the
maternal object is especially traumatic or intolerable and is subsequently disavowed,
arresting the process of its mourning and deferring its symbolic recovery. Kristeva
describes depression as a condition of “asymbolia,” or the breakdown in the function
of representation, in the subject’s ability to utilize language as compensation for the
lost object, resulting in withdrawal and inaction.
We can think of Kristeva’s formulation of the condition of asymbolia as an allegory
for the condition of the collective subject in global capitalism. Like Kristeva’s depressive
subject, the collective subject experiences a breakdown in the signifying function, in
the possibility of representing and articulating the social world in a holistic way. The
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stalling of this representational function is accompanied by a withdrawal from public
activity, the thwarting of organized collective agency, a popular inarticulateness, and a
sense of powerlessness and paralysis in the face of an unimaginable, unmappable, and
oppressive objectivity—an objectivity that is so banal that it is not recognized as
oppressive, but simply as “everyday life.” In Kristeva’s model of the depressive psychic
state, the stalling of the subject’s capacity for signification expresses itself as a “psy-
chomotor retardation” or “language retardation”—the literal slowing down and
exhaustion of the subject’s speech or linguistic activity (1989, p. 33). The speech of the
depressive person becomes slow, repetitive, and monotonous: the depressive person
utters “sentences that are interrupted, exhausted, come to a standstill. Even phrases …
cannot [be] formulate[d]” (p. 34). 
The idea of language retardation is significant in two ways when allegorizing the
collective subject in capitalism. First, Kristeva argues that language retardation results
in a skewed sense of time. As Kristeva argues, because the “time in which we live is
the time of our discourse,” the subject does not develop a sense of temporal continu-
ity, a sense of before and after, or a sense of a movement from the “past towards a
[future] goal” (1989, p. 60). Instead, the subject’s sense of time is that of a series of
exploded moments, which locks the subject into the past (a nostalgic, stationary past)
and blocks out a perspective of the future (p. 61). Kristeva argues that the lost object
is, therefore, not a place or a thing but a particular sense and experience of time (p.
61). The subject’s disjointed sense of temporality is accompanied by the breakdown
of the subject’s faculty of signification. This situation recollects that of the collective
subject in capitalism: the breakdown in the capacity to perceive, picture, represent the
social totality also describes the popular, collective submersion of a historical sensibil-
ity—the ability to perceive and represent historical continuity, the imperative connec-
tion between then, now, and that which may be.
As mentioned earlier, for Jameson, discourses of postmodernism—those sympto-
matic expressions of late-twentieth-century capitalism—tend to submerge the cate-
gory of history. The result is the aesthetic and conceptual collapsing of history into a
series of synchronic moments, the rendering of the past into a “vast collection of
images, [into] a multitudinous photographic simulacrum,” and finally the realizing of
Guy Debord’s vision of a “society bereft of all historicity, whose own putative past is
little more than a set of dusty spectacles” (Jameson, 1984, p. 66). Within postmod-
ernism, history becomes imagistic; it becomes, in Kristeva’s words, a “series of
exploded moments.” In the postmodern era, the proliferation of historical images, an
index of the evacuation of the popular perception of history as a material force, is
accompanied by a decline in the popular and collective ability to represent—to grasp,
categorically—history as a continuum, as a set of social relations transferred from one
generation to the next. Kristeva’s description of the psychic movement of depression
bears a striking similarity to Jameson’s description of what happens when a sense of
history is submerged in the cultural (that is, aesthetic, ideological, philosophical, et
cetera) forms of late capitalism:
[T]his mesmerizing new aesthetic mode itself emerged as an elaborated
symptom of the waning of our historicity, of our lived possibility of experi-
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encing history in some active way: it cannot therefore be said to produce this
strange occultation of the present by its own formal power, but merely to
demonstrate … the enormity of a situation in which we seem increasingly
incapable of fashioning representations of our own current experience.
(Jameson, 1984, p. 68)
Second, Kristeva argues that language retardation amounts to a “learned helpless-
ness” on the part of the depressive subject, which also recollects the conventional per-
ception of a lack of agency on the part of the collective subject in capitalism. Kristeva
describes the state of learned helplessness as such: “when all escape routes are
blocked, animals as well as men learn to withdraw rather than flee or fight. The retar-
dation or inactivity, which one might call depressive, would thus constitute a learned
defense reaction to a dead-end situation and unavoidable shocks” (1989, p. 34). The
capitalist mode of production produces a similar type of retardation and arrested
development in the social subject.2 A further analogy between Kristeva’s depressive
subject and the social subject in capitalism can be drawn in terms of the concept of
“affect.” Kristeva states, “Unbelieving in language, the depressive persons are affection-
ate, wounded to be sure, but prisoners of affect. The affect is their thing” (p. 14).
Bertolt Brecht argued that the bourgeoisie internalized the sense of danger that com-
plex, historical thought represented with respect to their interests in capitalist society.
This potential danger was expressed by the collective submersion of complex and his-
torical thinking by transforming it into something less threatening: “The bourgeoisie
was obliged to liquidate its purely intellectual exertions in a period when the pleas-
ures of thinking were likely to involve immediate risks for its economic interests.
Where thought was not completely turned off, it became ever more culinary. Use was
still made of the classics, but an ever more culinary use” (Brecht in Jameson, 1998,
p. 37). Jameson’s commentary on Brecht is likewise an effort to map a relationship
between a certain socio-economic context and a type of subjective economy:
There is here the suggestion, not of outright censorship, but of an instinctive
self-repression of real thought, of an all-too-knowing turning away from any-
thing that might lead you to unpleasant truths and to ideas of action which
either promise guilt or ask you to change your life. This is not, I think, a “vul-
gar Marxist” analysis. … On the contrary, it would seem to have its affinities
with Freud’s view of the patient he called the Rat Man, who had to make him-
self stupid, to stop himself from thinking, in order not to confront the
unwanted and thereby unconscious realities of his own existence. Consumer
society today, in the United States and increasingly elsewhere, faces a similar
dilemma and a similar block when it comes to thinking about the end results
of its socioeconomic system; and has certainly sacrificed its classics to far
more elaborate culinary distractions.  (Jameson, 1998, p. 37)
Social pathologies of late capitalism
While Kristeva focuses on the individual psychic subject, she suggests that her analy-
sis also has significance for the social subject. Observing depressive “symptoms” on
the social level, Kristeva argues that crises of thought, speech, and representation
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emerge in societies in response to large-scale, violent social traumas, such as the
Holocaust, Hiroshima, World Wars, et cetera. She argues, “[w]hat those monstrous
and painful sights do damage to are our systems of perception and representation. As
if overtaxed or destroyed by too powerful a breaker, our symbolic means find them-
selves hollowed out, nearly wiped out, paralyzed” (1989, p. 223). The results of such
traumas are a collective “illogicality and silence” and a preoccupation with an apoca-
lyptic rhetoric “carried out in two seemingly opposite, extreme fashions that comple-
ment each other: a wealth of images and a holding back of words” (p. 222).
Contemporary consumer-capitalist societies appear to substantiate Kristeva’s analysis:
the crisis of signification—the breakdown in the popular and collective faculty of rep-
resenting, to ourselves, the complexity and historical dimensions of the social world—
is, indeed, accompanied by the proliferation and predominance of images in the
public sphere—images which, as recognized by Guy Debord, assume the role of the
perfect, idealized commodity. The prerogative of the image is a defining characteristic
and index of postmodern capitalism.
Kristeva’s argument suggests there may be something like a collective depressive
psychopathology symptomatic of postmodern capitalism. But what happens if we
choose not to respect the conventional conceptual distinction between the individual
and the collectivity in the first place? What if an easy distinction between the individ-
ual and the social subject is really just one of those reifications generated by the dom-
inant bourgeois perceptual modality? If so, then what we call “the individual” is as
much an expression of larger social, cultural, and historical processes as it is a unique
psyche, physiology, personality, temperament, history, and so on, and “individual psy-
chopathologies” will have social conditions of manifestation as much as they express
a personal traumatic narrative. As such, we would need to displace a more conven-
tional reified conception of a clear distinction between individual pathology and col-
lective modality with the recognition of a mediated continuity between them. This is
the conceptual tack taken by David Michael Levin (1987) in his study “Clinical Stories:
A Modern Self in the Fury of Being.” Here, Levin argues that the difference between
the individual depressive pathology and the “normal” modality of the modern collec-
tive subject is more a difference of degree than a difference of kind. In other words, an
individual instance of psychopathology should be considered an extreme or concen-
trated instance of a more diffuse, generalized tendency in the wider collectivity:
In truth, what we are calling individual “psychopathology,” and are treating
as such, are only the more extreme cases of a collective suffering in which we
all take part in accordance with our individual constitution and character.
The “normal” is merely that which prevails and holds sway; but this could
be, after all, collective delusion, collective madness. We are therefore con-
cerned not only with a relatively small number of unfortunates, of “cases.”
We are also concerned, as in a dialectical sense we must be, with our forms
of social organization and their historical culture. (Levin, 1987, p. 482)
Levin’s analysis is one in an anthology of studies called Pathologies of the Modern
Self: Postmodern Studies on Narcissism, Schizophrenia, and Depression. These studies sit-
uate what the contributors argue is a growing instance (some use the term “epi-
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demic”) of these psychopathologies in contemporary society. Levin, in particular,
posits a dialectically mediated relationship between these pathologies and the process
of modernity itself, arguing that a pervasive nihilism constituting a kind of structure
of feeling in Western society (and which expresses itself as a collective narcissism and
an epidemic of clinical depressions) has manifested as the dialectical reversal of an
early modern humanism and concurrent secularization:
I contend that the three configurations of pathology examined in this book
[depression, narcissism, and schizophrenia] are historically interconnected in
a vicious epidemiological cycle. After the first and glorious phase of moder-
nity, when Western culture broke away from its mediaeval past and basked
in the sun of a healthy self-affirmation, an “excessive” pride, a cultural nar-
cissism elevated Man to the position occupied by God. In many ways, this
new spirit was good; but the historical forms the inflation eventually
assumed have slowly wounded our pride and created social and cultural con-
ditions within which a generalized collective depression has taken hold. Our
collective narcissistic defenses against these conditions have not only failed
as defenses; they have intensified the pathogenic conditions, contributing to
a life-world in which the modern Self finds itself deeply troubled by fragmen-
tation and disintegration.
These pathologies are not just psychological; nor are they just individual. They need
to be understood as social and cultural phenomena. (Levin, 1987, p. 485)
The idea that the historical process of modernity is experienced by its agents as
an infliction, as a sort of social trauma, is not a recent idea; it begins to emerge in var-
ious articulations as far back as the period of transition from traditional to modern
society itself. The experience of industrialism (the revolution of labour, production,
and re-organization of time-space) and of the emergence of capitalism, in particular,
have been theorized as a re-ordering of the senses, as a severing and compartmental-
ization of mental and physical faculties, and a re-scripting of human personality and
psychology requiring enormous and rapid physical, emotional, and intellectual adap-
tation.
Levin begins his paper by quoting Adorno in Minima Moralia: “If such a thing as
a psycho-analysis of today’s prototypical culture were possible … such an investiga-
tion would needs show the sickness proper to the time to consist precisely in normal-
ity” (Adorno quoted in Levin, 1987, p. 479). The breakdown in the collective faculty
for representing the articulated social object is, I argue, one way of describing the per-
vasive “sickness proper to the time.” It is what Levin calls the “collective madness”
which constitutes normality; it is a historically conditioned “collective delusion” (p.
482). For instance, is it not a “normalized,” and consequently largely unrecognized,
collective “sickness” of the social subject to have adapted to the consumption of so
rich a daily diet of logically contradictory social representations and narratives with-
out it producing a violent, immediate, and systemic rejection of these inconsistent
legitimizing narratives by the social body—that is, without triggering a collective
impulse to expel such narratives, which aggressively contradict the social body’s inter-
ests, experiences, and even means of survival?
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Our collective television-viewing habits in North America suggest as much. The
Lost Angeles Times reported on a Nielsen study that found the average U.S. household
watched TV for eight hours and eighteen minutes each day from September 2007 to
September 2008 (Los Angeles Times, 2008). Certain highly standardized and depend-
able myths underwrite the vast bulk of commercial television content, both fictional
and non-fictional. I would argue that the most hegemonic myth circumscribing tele-
vision content—everything from soap operas to sport spectacles, from crime dramas
to the evening news—involves the portrayal of the interests of capital (“industry,” the
business sector, the economic and political elite) as continuous with the interests of
the general collectivity or citizenry (“the people,” the nation, “our national interests,”
consumers, “Main Street,” and so on). Even after the 2008 economic crisis, it is still dif-
ficult to find narratives on commercial television that contradict this long empirically
refuted “trickle-down” interpretation of the flow of society’s wealth from top to bot-
tom. Few other myths today are so thoroughly naturalized while being, at the same
time, so consistently contradicted by historical evidence. Once this contradiction is
symbolically erased, for all intents and purposes, from the popular imaginary, a vast
array of subsequent contradictions can be portrayed as commonsensical. The secur-
ing of increasingly greater profits for industry—coded as “productivity”—can be por-
trayed as a necessary justification for countless violations of the social body that could
not otherwise be legitimated: the decimation of labour forces either through termina-
tion or piecemeal through wage reductions, benefit elimination, contract work, and
other strategies of labour flexibility; environmental devastation and the absence of
political will to address long-term environmental concerns and sustainability; the dis-
mantling of welfare programs; increasing poverty and homelessness; advertising and
promotional campaigns in schools; a reduction in public spending on the institutions
of education and health care; the poisoning of the global food supply with chemicals
that are toxic to human beings but increase productivity, shelf-life, and salability; the
conventionalizing of devastating labour conditions and environmental standards in
the global South; and illegal territorial expansion, occupation, and war.
Conclusion: Representing the lost object
Can we imagine a resolution of the depressive modality of the collective subject in cap-
italism? For Kristeva, the effects of the emotional trauma that structures the psyche in
the depressive individual are not intransigent. Kristeva identifies a mode of transcend-
ing the depressive state, a mode she characterizes as an aesthetic and symbolic exer-
cise. She refers to this exercise as sublimation:
The melancholy Thing … prevents working out the loss within the psyche. How
can one approach … [a resolution]? Sublimation is an attempt to do so: through
melody, rhythm, semantic polyvalency, the so-called poetic form, which decom-
poses and recomposes signs, is the sole “container” seemingly able to secure an
uncertain but adequate hold over the Thing. (Kristeva, 1989, p. 14)
Kristeva uses the example of literary production as a gesture (usually uncon-
scious) on the part of the subject to confront object loss, to cease the denial of separa-
tion of subject and object, and to engage in the symbolic recovery of the object. The
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literary representation enacts for the subject the sentiment of “‘no, I haven’t lost; I
evoke, I signify through the artifice of signs and for myself what has been parted from
me’… [ensuring] the subject’s entrance into the universe of signs and creation” (p. 23).
The aesthetic gesture is more cathartic in character than elaborational, and it facili-
tates “a survival, a resurrection” (or “rebirth”) of the psychic subject. On a different
register, Jameson suggests something similar about the sublimatory political potential
of the representational exercise he calls cognitive mapping:
[A] new [totalizing] political art—if it is indeed possible at all—will have to
hold to the truth of postmodernism, that is to say to its fundamental object—
the world space of multinational capital—at the same time at which it
achieves a breakthrough to some as yet unimaginable new mode of repre-
senting this last, in which we may again begin to grasp our positioning as
individual and collective subjects and regain a capacity to act and struggle
which is at present neutralized by our spatial as well as our social confusion.
The political form of postmodernism, if there ever is any, will have as its voca-
tion the invention and projection of a global cognitive mapping, on a social
as well as a spatial scale. (Jameson, 1984, p. 92)
Jameson’s argument, expressed more bluntly elsewhere, is “that without a con-
ception of the social totality (and the possibility of transforming a whole social sys-
tem), no properly socialist politics is possible” (Jameson, 1988, p. 355). But Marx also
reminds us that ushering in a “beyond capitalism” is not a matter of mentally project-
ing outside our time and place, but of taking up the opportunities offered by the pres-
ent moment—a practice that consequently results in obsolescing the present moment:
“Communism is for us not a state of affairswhich is to be established, an ideal to which
reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the realmovement which abol-
ishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the
premises now in existence” (Marx & Engels, 1978, p. 162). For Marx, then, sublimation
may be a symbolic act, but the emphasis is on the act. Utopia is not a positive vision
of something outside of capital, but a negative force internal to capital—something
we could call its structural opening to a radical otherness—mobilized in the present.
Notes
1. I mean “spirit” in the renewed Hegelian sense of a social collectivity (cf. Jameson, 2010).
2. A historical connection can be traced between this concept of affect, on the level of the individual
psyche, and Negri & Hardt’s observation in their book Empire (2000) that production in the contem-
porary historical conjuncture is characterized by the predominance of what they call “affective labour.”
I explore this argument in an article called “‘Fredric Jameson, Notwithstanding’: The Dialectic of
Affect” (Best, 2011) in Rethinking Marxism. 
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